A new approach for the description of phenomena of social aggregation is suggested. On the basis of psychological concepts (as for instance social norms and cultural coordinates), we deduce a general mechanism for the social aggregation in which different clusters of individuals can merge according to the cooperation among the agents. In their turn, the agents can cooperate or defect according to the clusters distribution inside the system. The fitness of an individual increases with the size of its cluster, but decreases with the work the individual had to do in order to join it. In order to test the reliability of such new approach, we introduce a couple of simple toy models with the features illustrated above. We see, from this preliminary study, how the cooperation is the most convenient strategy only in presence of very large clusters, while on the other hand it is not necessary to have one hundred percent of cooperators for reaching a totally ordered configuration with only one megacluster filling the whole system.
Introduction
The study of the evolution of social systems is a topic nowadays attracting the interest of researchers from different domains such as physics, psychology, mathematics. In fact, an interdisciplinary approach provides a more powerful way to understand and model such complex systems [1] . One important issue within this field is the understanding of the phenomena of social aggregation, as for instance urbanization, cultural clusterization, imitative processes in econophysics.
The classical approach of sociophysics is by means of Statistical Mechanics: the system under analysis is considered in a thermodynamical way, i.e. it is seen as composed by a great number of identical elementary units and, starting from the rules governing the microscopical dynamics of individuals, the general behaviour at macroscopical level is achieved. Consequently, this methodology is very useful in those systems whose peculiarity is produced by statistical laws rather than by specific microscopic details [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] .
On the other hand, a different approach is also possible, by means of the analysis of cooperative behaviours, in particular the study of the emergence of cooperation in systems of generic agents [8, 9, 10] , in financial markets [11] or in academic networks [12] . The main theoretical scaffolding to face such issues is borrowed from game theory, largely used in econophysics, which focuses on the evolution of the strategies that agents use during their interactions [13, 14] .
Social norms, beliefs, attitudes and opinions are also concepts which have attracted the interest of researchers from a great number of different fields [15, 16, 17, 18] . Certainly, it is quite hard to define explicitly those objects, but reaching a reliable representation of them is a required step in order to implement models for social dynamics. Psychology and sociology are useful tools to provide definitions for concepts like previous ones, but what we need here is just an operational definition in order to make our models useful.
On the one hand, sharing the same beliefs, attitudes, opinions and in general social norms, means to use the same "cultural coordinates" to communicate, enhancing the process of "social meaning negotiation" [19] , defined as the interaction of two individuals who do not share the same lexicon or meanings, and increasing the probability to converge to the same "social cluster". On the other hand, social fragmentation can be viewed also as the result of this same process [19] . Moreover, social norms are objects intrinsically linked together and there is a natural resistance to change cultural coordinates because it is possible to see them as the product of well-established neural circuits and because frequently a change would cause a cascade effect on the others. Thus, importing a psychological representation of cultural coordinates (CC) means at least to take into consideration three main characteristics:
• CC are hard to change.
• People who have the same CC belong to the same cultural cluster.
• The degree of cultural separation among agents, that is how much their social norms are different, can be defined as a sort of "distance" in the abstract space of the CC.
The last crucial ingredient we have to consider here is the role of the environment on the negotiation strategies. Indeed, from a sociological point of view, it is well-known that belonging to a big cultural cluster (i.e. sharing the same CC with a great amount of people) increases the individual fitness [20, 21] . Consequently the macroscopic features of a population influence the probability to change its own CC to increase the size of the group.
Finally, the main role of social sciences in this challenge is to link in an ecological way the microscopic dynamics (i.e. the evolution strategy of individual) with the macroscopic phenomenology (i.e. the state of the whole system).
Social aggregation and game theory
The purpose of this paper is to study the phenomena of social aggregation by unifying the thermodynamical approach with the game-theoretical one, and using the psychological concepts depicted in the Introduction. More precisely, we want to write down models whose microscopical dynamics is defined starting from the payoff matrix of each agent. In other words, the interaction between two individuals is determined (also) by their payoff matrix, and in their turn the payoff matrices of the individuals evolve according with the dynamics. The details of the dynamics, i.e. the payoff matrix, will be determined on the basis of psycho-sociological considerations. We stress that our aim is just to suggest a new methodology, therefore the models introduced here have the minimum amount of refinement required for such a purpose.
Let us consider a system of N agents where every agent belongs to a cluster. Each cluster represents a group of individuals who share the same cultural coordinates. From a psychological point of view we start considering two main assumptions. First, we assume that an agent tends to maintain his CC. At the same time every agent has an advantage to belong to a group as big as possible. On the basis of such considerations we can state that the fitness of an individual increases with the number of other individuals sharing its same social norms, i.e. with the size of its cluster. On the other hand, the fitness decreases according to an "economic criterion", that is according to the work the individual accomplished in order to merge with its actual group. In practice, when a player i meets an opponent j from a stranger cluster, its payoff matrix iŝ
where the indices κ, λ can indicate C, "cooperation" (availability to join the opponent's group), D, "defection" (that is "no cooperation"), while m i is the population of the cluster of the player i, m j the population of the opponent's cluster, and d ij is the distance (in the CC space) between the two clusters. Finally, the function w 1 (m) is the fitness contribution of m individuals, and w 2 (d) is the work (i.e. the loss of fitness) an agent has to bear to cover a distance equal to d.
The meaning of Eq. (1) is then the following: when two cooperators meet, they put in common their CC, and this is equivalent to the merging of their groups into one. Moreover, we assume that they "meet in the middle", so that the work spent is half of the one due to the original distance between them. If the opponent does not cooperate, the first player has to cover the entire distance d ij to gain the CC of the opponent's cluster, and he will lose contact with its original group. On the contrary, if the first player does not cooperate (but the opponent does) it will not spend anything but gain to its group only the presence of the second player. Finally, if nobody cooperates, nothing will happen. Of course, it is meant that only players from different clusters can meet, or equivalently, that when two players from the same group meet, nothing happens.
It must be noticed that the property of the clusters to merge when two cooperators meet is a strong assumption. Anyway, there are many situations in which this assumption is quite realistic. For example, let us consider the spreading of technological or cultural advances through different populations: when an individual meets from a stranger group a new technique useful to face successfully some not yet resolved problem, presumably he will import that into his original social cluster. If the new technique improves appreciably the fitness of the population, then it will soon become a common knowledge of all the members, and under this aspect the two clusters have merged together. Similar processes can happen for other cultural instances, as for example languages, religions, traditions. Finally, we stress the fact that the goal of this paper is just to present a couple of simple toy models in order to show how this new approach should work. Thus, the models we are going to present in the following sections, both developed starting from Eq. (1), are very simple and deserve to be improved in the future. At last, for simplicity it is reasonable to assume the fitness functions w 1 (m) and w 2 (d) as proportional to the population and to the distance, respectively. Moreover, to make easier calculations, we set equal to 1 the proportionality constants (⇒ w i (x) = x), so that the payoff matrix gets the general form
Static Homogeneous Model
As a first step our study, we analyze an oversimplified static model, which we call "static homogeneous model" (SHM): we assume that the system is always perfectly homogeneous, so that all the players obey to the same payoff matrix. More precisely, we consider a system made up by a great number of identical clusters, each one of the same size m and at the same distance from each other:
we consider such distance 2x big enough to consider the fitness contribution of one individual negligible with respect to the work needed to cover it: 2x ≫ 1 (anyway, as it is easy to verify, this approximation does not change appreciably the physics of the model). So, the payoff matrixÂ of Eq. (2) becomeŝ
where ε = m − x − 1 (this will turn out to be the crucial parameter of the SHM). Of course it is always x > 0. Now, we want just to understand which is the rational strategy the agents should adopt when meeting foreigners (interactions between players of the same clusters are not taken into account), in the given configuration, neglecting any possible time evolution.
Said p(t) the density of cooperators, its behaviour is given by replicator equation [22, 23] 
where f C is the averaged payoff of a cooperator and Â H the averaged payoff of a generic player. We have to stress the fact that we consider this system as frozen, and the time evolution given by the previous equation must be seen just as a mathematical trick in order to discover the Nash equilibria of the matrix (3). Explicitly, the replicator equation becomes dp dt
with
The Nash equilibria of Eq. (5) are in general the roots of the polynomial at right side:
In order to understand the phenomenology, it is important to find also the stability of the equilibria given in Eq. (7). The explicit evaluation of the stability is left in Appendix, here we just give the results obtained.
CASE ε < 0 -The payoff matrix is here a Prisoner Dilemma's one. This condition is equivalent to m < x + 1: the distance among clusters is high enough that the work needed to merge with another group is always greater than the maximum gain possible in case of cooperation. Thus, in this case the Nash equilibrium p For ε > 0 the continuous lines at p E = 0 and p E = 1 represent the (pure) stable Nash equilibria, the dotted line represents the (mixed) unstable Nash equilibrium
+ , i.e. ε → 0 + the unstable equilibrium collapses on p E = 1, while for m → +∞, i.e. ε → +∞ it collapses on p E = 0: in this limit only the all-cooperators configuration is stable. For ε < 0 p Despite its roughness, this simple model allows us to draw some preliminary conclusions. In particular, it seems to be clear that cooperation is an advantageous strategy only when the size of the clusters is much bigger than their averaged distance. In the next section we will improve our investigation by means of the dynamical homogeneous model.
Dynamical Homogeneous Model
The main feature of the SHM is that the system is frozen, i.e. does not evolve in time: we set it in a given configuration (a great number of equal clusters of the same size and at the same distance from each other) and wonder which is the most rational strategy agents should adopt in order to improve their own fitness, without making them "play the game" for real. What we want to do now is to write down a model with the general properties stated in section 2, which can also evolve dynamically in time. For this purpose, we are now going to introduce the "dynamical homogeneous model" (DHM).
DHM is implemented as follows. At t = 0 we divide a system of N individuals into clusters each one of size m 0 , so that we have initially N/m 0 clusters of the same size (we always set N as a multiple of m 0 ). Every generic cluster i is identified by a natural variable g i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N m 0 }: then, the distance between two agents belonging to the clusters j and k respectively will be d jk = |g j − g k | (notice that with such definition the distance is a discrete variable too). Moreover, each agent has a default strategy (cooperative or not cooperative), picked up randomly, so that the initial density of cooperators is ̺ 0 . The dynamics works in this way: at each elementary step two different agents, i and j, are drawn. If they belong to the same cluster, nothing happens. Otherwise, they "play the game" according to the payoff matrix (2) and their actual strategy: if both players cooperate, their clusters merge (the smallest is absorbed by the biggest one); if one player defects, the cooperator leaves its cluster and joins the opponent's one; if nobody cooperates nothing happens. After the game, a player computes what it would have gained if it had adopted the other strategy (remaining fixed the strategy of the opponent). If such virtual payoff is greater than the real one, the player will change its strategy at the next interaction. For simplicity, in order to have easier simulations, even though the payoff is always calculated by means of the matrix (2), in case of two clusters merging (when a pair of cooperators from different groups meet), the smallest group enters the biggest one: in practice, they spend fitness as "meeting in the middle", but in fact, it is the small cluster to reach the big one in its position. Time is measured in montecarlo steps, so that on average every agent interacts once per time unit. We accomplished all our simulations with ̺ 0 = 1/2 and for several values of m 0 and N. In Figure 2 we report the typical behaviour of the DHM for a particular choice of the parameters (N = 3024, m 0 = 4). This figure well summarizes the phenomenology of our model. We can clearly distinguish three different dynamical regimes: at early times we have Regime I, that we also call "exponential decay regime" for reasons we will soon explain, then we find a steady-state regime or Regime II, and finally we have Regime III, in which the system rapidly reaches a frozen state: we are going to study them separately in the following subsections.
Before analysing in details the three dynamical regimes, it is convenient to write down the equations ruling the evolution of the main quantities which characterize the state of the system. Concerning the cooperators density, which will be here indicated by ̺(t), starting from the payoff matrixÂ written in Eq. 2, it is easy to see that its time evolution must be ruled by the equation
where i is an agent randomly extracted, j another agent randomly extracted not belonging to the same cluster of i, m i the size of the cluster of i, β ij the probability that m j − d ij /2 is smaller than one, α ij the probability that the quantity m j − m i + 1 − d ij is smaller than zero. Finally, the symbol · i,j means of course the average over every possible couple i, j (with i and j belonging to different clusters). Analogously, the time evolution of the averaged size of the survived clusters, m(t), will be given by
Exponential decay regime
At the very early stages of the dynamics, we can assume that the payoff matrix of each agent (when interacting with foreigners) has the form
with m 0 ≃ m i ∀i and, as we have already stated,
In such case we have β ij = β ∀i and α ij = 1 ∀i, j: in the limit N ≫ m i (we will treat the case of m 0 equal to a finite fraction of N in subsection 4.4) equations (8) and (9) becomė
whose solutions are, respectively
and
Now, said d = d ij i,j , in this regime it is β = Pr(m 0 −d/2 < 1), and this probability depends in general on m 0 and N. Anyway, it is straightforward to understand that Regarding the averaged size of survived clusters, we see from Eq. (14) that, while it remains valid, m(t) is bigger than m 0 and smaller than the quantity
so that m(t) is practically constant during this regime: a proof of the last statement is given already in Figure 2 , where it is clear how m(t) is a quasi-constant in the initial stages of the dynamics. More precisely, it is a quasi-constant apart a small initial increasing due to the interactions among cooperators during the very early times of the dynamics, and indeed such increase vanishes in the limit ρ 0 → 0 + (see Figure 5 ). It must be noticed that, because for every survived cluster k it must be m k > 0, and we are dealing with small values of m 0 , this means that the clusters distribution inside the system remains rather close to the initial one (see also Figure 7 ). Moreover, we emphasize the fact that the quantity m ∞ is just a limit superior of m(t) during the exponential decay regime, and not a value that the averaged size can effectively reach. The exponential decay regime will last until the cooperators density is not too small: we expect actually that it should end when ̺ becomes of the order of N −1 . From Eq. (13) we gain
For the case depicted in Figure 3 (β = 1, ̺ 0 = 0.5, N = 10000), previous relation gives t * ≈ 8.5, in good agreement with the numerical data. For values of m 0 greater than 1, the evaluation of t * directly from Eq. (15) is more delicate because in this case also the quantity β depends in its turn on N, and moreover there are bigger fluctuations in the system (when two cooperators meet their groups merge, and this causes bigger fluctuations in clusters distribution as m increases); however the relation t * ∝ log(N) is valid ∀m 0 , as we will see in subsection 4.2. Therefore, for N → +∞ this regime never ends: ̺(t) → 0 and, from Eq. (14), we find m(t) ≃ m 0 = const. Then, in the thermodynamical limit (when m 0 ≪ N for every finite m 0 ) we have a similar result of the SHM, where the unique (stable) Nash equilibrium is the complete absence of cooperators. On the other hand, this is coherent with the fact that, if we set the system ab initio with ̺ 0 = 0, nothing will ever happen.
Steady state
Once, for finite values of N, the cooperators density became very small and the system left the Regime I, the equation (11) is not valid any more. Indeed, in this case almost every interaction will be between two defectors, so that equation (8) becomeṡ
where we took into accounts that from Eq. (14) the clusters distribution is practically the initial one, and then we assumed again N ≫ m i and α ij = α ∀i, j. But, as we have just said, the clusters density is still almost equal to the initial one, so that it must be also α = Pr(1 − d < 0) ≃ 1, from whicḣ
In Figure 6 we can see this behaviour for the case N = 3024 and m 0 = 2; in Figure  7 we show instead how the majority of the agents remains in the initial cluster also during this second dynamical regime. As we can easily see, ̺(t) is actually almost constant, just slightly increasing because of small fluctuations in the clusters distribution which make α not perfectly equal to one, but a very little bit smaller. On the other hand, m(t) keeps on behaving as in the exponential decay regime. This can be seen by inserting Eq. (17) into (12), obtaininġ Upper graph: cooperators density and averaged clusters size (divided by N ) for a DHM system with N = 10000 and m 0 = 1 until t max = 20 time units (data averaged after 100 different simulations). Lower graph: density of "conservative sites", that is the sites which are still in the initial cluster, for the same system of the upper graph. As one can see, after an initial drop, the majority of agents (about the 60%) is still in its original group also during the steady state regime.
where we exploited again the fact that m(t) does not change too much during the Regime I. Now, while the quantity m 0 ̺ 2 ss t remains much smaller than N, also m(t) remains close to m 0 (see Figures 2 and 6 ). However, once the relation m 0 ̺ 2 ss t ≪ N ceases to be true, the system exits from the steady state regime, because at this point m(t) ≫ m 0 and the clusters distribution is now quite different from the initial one: so, also the quantities α ij in Eq. (8) become considerably smaller than 1 and this changes dramatically the shape of ̺(t) too, as shown in Figure 2 .
Before starting the analysis of the subsequent regime, it is worth to take a look to the behaviour of ̺ ss as a function of N and m 0 . For m 0 = 1, from Eq. (15) it has to be necessarily
The same behaviour is found for higher m 0 , as one can see in Figure 8 , so that we can conclude stating the relation
Of course, last equation, together with (15), demonstrates also that the time t * for leaving the Regime I is proportional to log(N) for every value of m 0 . 
Frozen state
It is straightforward to understand that the steady state cannot last forever. Indeed, according to Eq. (18), the survived clusters averaged size should diverge after a timet given byt
Anyway, it is obviously impossible that m → +∞, since of course m(t) ≤ N. In fact, the dynamics freezes well before this timet: in Figure 9 we report the behaviour of the freezing time for a couple of values of m 0 , from which it is possible to see that the freezing time t F follows actually a power-law on N, but with exponent δ ≈ 0.8 instead of 3.
Here we wonder what kind of frozen state is finally reached by the system. Let us consider the general equation (9) ruling over the evolution of m(t). Assuming the sizes of survived clusters as independent from each other at every time, so that we can write By integrating last relation, we find now
being K a suitable (positive) constant. Now, in the limit t → +∞, there is an instant t F (the freezing time we introduced above) such that ̺(t) = ̺(t F ) ∀t ≥ t F , and said ̺ F this cooperators density of the frozen state, from equation (21) it is clear that there are only two possible final configurations:
• (A) -If we have ̺ F = 0 (no cooperators in the final state), then it must necessarily be m F < N, that is the frozen state is disordered.
• (B) -If instead we have ̺ F > 0 (finite fraction of cooperators in the final state), then the integral at right side diverges, so that it must be m F = N, thus the frozen state is ordered (i.e. only one survived cluster remains in the system).
The configuration (A) is completely lacking in cooperators, so, in order to be frozen, the difference in size between two clusters whatever must be always less than their distance minus 1: in the opposite case, as one can see from the payoff matrix (2), there would be players who could become cooperators after an interaction. On the other hand, the configuration (B) is pretty easy to understand, since when the entire system is occupied by just one cluster, dynamics stops by definition. Now, in the steady state regime, the cooperators density is so small that it is possible to get a fluctuation pushing the system in the disordered frozen state, with no cooperators and many clusters in it. If instead such a fluctuation does not happen, the normal dynamics given by equations (8) and (9), or even more simply by (21) , will drive the system into the ordered frozen state, with a finite density of cooperators, and one mega-cluster occupying the whole system. For these reasons we expect that the probability of the system to end in the disordered frozen configuration increases with ̺ ss decreasing, i.e. with N increasing and m 0 decreasing. Actually, for m 0 = 1 and after 1000 simulations, we observed the system ending in the ordered state only three times for N = 100, just once for N = 200, and never for higher N. On the other hand for m 0 ≥ 4, we did not ever observe the system falling in the disordered configuration, since in this case ̺ ss becomes small enough only at very high N, when the freezing time is too big to be observed. Finally, the ratio between the number of times in which the frozen state is ordered over the number in which it is ordered drops from 0.86 for N = 200 to 0.1 for N = 2000 in the case m 0 = 2, and it is still 0.95 for N = 3024 when m 0 = 3.
An interesting aspect of the ordered configuration is that the density of cooperators is in this case finite but less than one: so, even though the disordered frozen state is just the Nash equilibrium p E 1 = 0 of the SHM (see section 3), the ordered one is not the perfect counterpart of the analogous in SHM. That can be explained because when the system is very close to the completely ordered state, the agents belonging to the biggest cluster have no interest in cooperation, so that most of them will be defectors. This is shown in Figures 2 and 10 where it is easy to see how the abundance of cooperators in the frozen ordered state is always well smaller than 1/2 (remaining around 1/3). On the other hand, this is not a real Nash equilibrium, since it does not exist in the thermodynamical limit. 
Limit of very large initial clusters
Until now we have dealt with small values of the initial clusters size m 0 : more precisely, so far we have exploited the thermodynamical limit supposing fixed m 0 as N increases. Now, one could wonder what happens to the system if we set instead m 0 = zN (with 0 < z < 1) before doing the limit N → +∞. Indeed, in the SHM, a transition between the phase with the unique stable Nash equilibrium p E 1 and the phase with two stable equilibria (in particular the new one p E 2 ) takes place for m = x + 1, being x the half averaged distance among all clusters. An analogous transition in DHM somehow happens, but in a rather trivial way: indeed, when m 0 diverges (even remaining much smaller than N), a single interaction between two cooperators will create a new cluster very much bigger than the others, thus the system will reach the ordered state soon, typically after much less than 10 time units.
Conclusions and Perspectives
In this paper we have depicted some new ideas for the study and the understanding of the phenomena of social aggregation in human communities. First, we suggested a theoretical treatment based on both statistical mechanics and game theory. Secondly, a fundamental feature of our approach is the interplay between the inclination of every agent to cooperate with others (in order to live in groups as big as possible), and an opposite attitude not to move away from the actual group since joining a new one involves a work accomplished by the agent itself. This work, needed by an individual when it associates to a stranger cluster, is interpreted as a "distance" in the abstract space of cultural coordinates: the more two groups have different CC, the more they are far away from each other in this space, the more is the work an individual must spend to go from one cluster to the other. In order to test the reliability of this approach, we conceived a couple of very simple toy models, both constructed with the general features described above, the first one being a pure evolutionary population model, the second one an agent model with a well defined dynamics at a microscopical level.
The results obtained with such toy models suggest that cooperation is the most suitable strategy only in presence of very big clusters, so that the gain in fitness of the individuals who join these big groups is greater than the distance they had to cover to reach their new "accommodation". More precisely, using the language of game theory, we found that cooperation is an evolutionary stable Nash equilibrium, when the averaged size of clusters is bigger enough with respect to the averaged distance among them.
These models are of course a tough simplification of the real world, and contain some unsatisfactory features: in particular, the property of the clusters to merge when two cooperators of them meet is quite strong, and also the definition of distance between clusters appears to be somehow arbitrary. Improving the models in these aspects can be the goal of future researches. Anyway, despite such problems, our results are qualitatively realistic for some important social phenomena which involve human societies. Indeed, our results suggest that in an area occupied by a great deal of small communities, distributed more or less uniformly, nobody has interest to move from home to another community, since there is no real difference among the communities, and a displacement would mean only a work to accomplish without any gain in fitness. However, when some of these communities, because of a change in the external conditions, or for a simple fluctuation, become quite big with respect to the other ones, they assume the role of centres of attraction, destinations of the immigration of people from anywhere, so that these centres reach soon the typical size of a metropolis. This aggregation mechanism seems actually to be what really happened during several urbanization phenomena through history, as for instance the "urban explosion" in the basin of the Mediterranean Sea around the XII Century BC, or also in Western Europe during the Industrial Revolution. It is worth to notice that in this picture the merging of two groups when only two cooperators interact is not so unrealistic, since presumably an immigrant will call and invite to the big city his former fellow citizens. Moreover, in many cases this same dynamics is apparently at work when religions, political parties, idioms or other kinds of social aggregations grow up inside a society. Finally, it is worth also to mention the result that, as we saw in subsection 4.3, it is not really necessary that every individual has to cooperate in order to merge different clusters into one: on the contrary, the fraction of cooperators can be less than 0.5 also in systems made up of only one big cultural cluster.
Of course, deeper studies and further interpretations are needed, but the fact that so oversimplified models give already reasonable results is very encouraging and suggest to continue with this kind of study.
